A pan-British Commentary on the Recent Scottish Independence Referendum


A view from Scotland – by Tamara Szucs

One of my Politics lecturers at university, Dr Michael Dyer covered Scottish independence pretty decisively: nae happenin’. His argument went like this – if Quebec, with much more distinctive traditions and identity than Scotland and a fully fledged sovereignty movement since the 1960s, voted against independence twice (!) in 34 years, independence could never win in much less uniformly nationalistic Scotland.

Plus, for a country inside a country, Scotland has a bloody good deal. The Scots put less tax into the great British purse than what they receive in subsidies from Westminster (the seat of the UK government) and the Scottish government already decides independently on education, healthcare, economy, local government, law and order, housing, transport, and environment.

Therefore, it came as a surprise when in 2007 the Scottish National Party (SNP), running solely on the ‘Freedom!’ ticket, won the parliamentary election of traditionally Labour-minded (read: social democratic) Scotland. Until then, the public had looked at the SNP and its leader, Alex Salmond as a curious, albeit not overly harmful growth on the body of Scottish politics – sort of how most Brits scoff at the UK Independence Party and its anti-EU campaign.

Yet, Salmond managed to get re-elected in 2011 and then two weeks ago four million Scots were asked if Scotland should become independent (I’ll cut to the chase – they said no). Although headlines framed the 55%-against result as a “resounding no”, this is far from being homogenous. With over 84% of the eligible voters actually bothering to vote (the highest turn-out in the UK since 1951!), the spectrum ranges from the loudest ‘aye’ at 57% in Dundee to a full two-thirds saying ‘nope’ on Orkney.

Psephologists (word of the day; those dealing with electoral analysis) will be feasting on the above stats for years to come, spewing out all kinds of theories, none of which are likely to explain what exactly happened at the referendum on 18 September. They also won’t be able to say for certain whether there will ever be an independent Scotland.

But this seems clear: as much as the 1707 union of England and Scotland was a “shotgun wedding”, independence would be a “painful divorce”, hitting the Scottish economy, and therefore the general population hard. Thus, as the Queen of the UK of Twitter noted on the morning after the vote: having looked up the kilt of nationalism, Scotland has chosen the trousers of Union…

A view from England – by Dan Hartas

South of the border, the referendum result has received a general welcome, though not without a certain trepidation about how we’re going to move forward. Support for the Union remains strong in England, and opinion polls consistently report that the English wanted the Scots to reject independence. But it’s clear the Union is going to have to change, and the English are increasingly concerned about getting fair representation after that change.

In the last days of the referendum campaign, the leaders of the major UK parties promised the Scottish Parliament a great deal more autonomy than they possess right now: the power to control taxation, borrowing, and certain aspects of social security. England has no devolved government of its own, and on all of these issues – as well as healthcare, education, and transport – it is ruled directly by the UK Parliament, sometimes by governments that couldn’t govern without Scottish or Welsh support.

That’s not democratic, but it’s not even the main issue. Scotland is now much wealthier than the poor North of England, yet receives around €1,700 per person more in government spending. The English are starting to get irritated by Scotland increasingly keeping its wealth to itself, rather than allowing it to be shared out among the poor across the UK. The worry is that with Scotland’s new autonomy, this trend will get worse.

Nowadays, when the English talk about the Scots over a pint of beer, they no longer understand the dislike, the resent, the insular extreme of Scottish nationalism. The History has been history for a long time. We know all too well that the custom in Scotland is to support “anyone but England” in the football, even while we cheer Scottish athletes like Andy Murray and Chris Hoy as our own. English people, when asked where they come from, overwhelmingly say “the UK”. Scots say “Scotland”.

Not that there’s anything wrong with that, but the English feel rejected and dismayed. After the referendum, with the Scottish government’s new powers, that’s likely to turn into something more assertive, and the English will likely demand as much self-determination as has been granted to the other UK nations. England hates artificial borders, and we will never be a federal country, so we’ll probably end up with some ridiculous, nonsense, constitutional hodgepodge. But change is in the air, and I’m sure this story isn’t over.

A view from Wales – by Stephen Westlake

What does it all mean for Wales? The answer seems to be that no one knows, and those who seem to care aren’t getting much of a look-in when it comes to the UK-wide debate. The leaders of the three big UK national parties pushed the panic button in response to polls giving the “Yes” campaign a shot at victory the week before the referendum. The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats all signed a pledge, printed on the front page of Scottish newspaper the Daily Record, promising further devolution within the Union should Scotland vote “No”. Alongside this was the promise of “a continuation of the Barnett allocation”. The Barnett formula is the current convoluted and anachronistic method of dispersing tax revenues amongst the member nations of the United Kingdom. This system already allocates Scotland a greater percentage of public spending per head than Wales despite its higher GDP per capita.

In 2009 the independent Holtham Commission found that the current allocation left the Welsh Assembly Government underfunded by €384 million. The Commission’s final report was initially greeted enthusiastically by all main political parties in Wales, and Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones has repeatedly promised to push for reform of the current funding situation. But by signing up to continuance of the Barnett formula, which all Welsh political parties have recognized as unfair, the UK leadership of each of the big three parties demonstrate once again how marginal Wales’ voice is in these debates about the future of Britain. Ironically, this comes after Carwyn Jones outlined arguably the most rational and practical proposals for constitutional reform yet proposed, which would see all the four member nations of the United Kingdom represented in a new upper house to replace the antiquated House of Lords.

These proposals, and the voices of the Welsh politics more generally, have clearly been dismissed or simply ignored by the Westminster leadership. There is little hunger for independence in Wales, with recent polls placing support at around 10%, but frustration within Wales at being continually politically overlooked and economically short-changed contributes to an even greater danger to the United Kingdom than secessionism; political apathy.

A view from Northern Ireland – by John McLean

Northern Ireland and Scotland share a rich cultural and linguistic heritage through the protestant, unionist ‘Ulster Scots’ who settled in Ireland’s north which is reflected in the many catholic, republican Irish who settled over the years in Scotland’s east. The historical roots crossing the Irish Sea are many, old, varied and unlike those between Scotland, England and Wales. As such, a particular aspect of the referendum debate had peculiar resonance in Northern Ireland which would not have been felt quite so keenly in the rest of the United Kingdom.

Historical affiliations became fully visible just a few days prior to the vote when thousands of ‘Orangemen’ from the protestant religious order, the Loyal Orange Lodge, travelled from Northern Ireland to take part in Scottish parades in support of the No campaign. There is also no doubt that the Irish, republican heritage in Glasgow played its part in delivering a Yes vote in that city.

The shared divisions are centuries old, and have a recent history of bubbling over in Northern Ireland – and Scotland also, particularly Glasgow. But, despite the potential for trouble, the referendum event remained largely calm. Where one would quite recently have expected an outpouring of sectarian rhetoric – and even violent clashes – all too familiar with residents of both Belfast and Glasgow, there was only a mild simmer to be heard.

Murmured grumbles should not be ignored, but the referendum has been a successful acid test of democracy in action in more than just the magnificent 84.5% turnout and dynamic grassroots discussion that took place in Scotland. In Northern Ireland, too, the process was followed, debated and supported principally on the core political issues, regardless of how inherited and entrenched viewpoints may have been.

With its own self-perception issues to be deliberated over at length in the coming decades, one can only hope that Northern Ireland can continue to follow in the example of Scotland and lead a debate on the issues that matter rather than on ancient quarrels.


One can hope.




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